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Argument overview:
It seems to me to be of more than passing interest that the generations of legal
scholars who enshrined Marbury as establishing the important power of judicial review
wrote in support of the Progressive Era and New Deal Era project of building state
capacity. They tended to support a role of the Court in authorizing the expansion of the
power and scope of the national government. But Marbury has certainly undergone a
rereading of late; critics of the earlier view have rethought Marshall's accomplishments
and downgraded Marbury's role as they debunk the notion that the Court has been a
powerful agent of change. Critics who decry the power and reach of the contemporary
Court, who see the Court constitutionalizing political issues, supplanting majoritarian
decision-making, and attempting to arrogate sole authority to pronounce on the meaning
of the Constitution come in a variety of political hues. While conservative critics attack
activists who would seek to realize their purposes in Court--e.g., rights expansion, liberal
and progressive critics wonder why we need judicial review when the Court, even at its
best, hasn't been very effective in improving the status or constitutional position of
discrete and insular minorities (and is so obviously political and results-driven most of
the time). But if the celebrators of judicial review and of Marbury wrote during a period
of statebuilding, what is the political consequence of "juristocracy" thinking now? While
it is obvious that both conservatives and liberals writing in this vein are interested in
curbing Court power and enhancing democratic deliberation where it is currently being
silenced or supplanted, there is a clear political struggle about what a more vigorous
democratic order would look like. Is it not possible that scholars who would take the
constitution away from the Court provide the intellectual foundations for an era of
contracting state power, or nation-state dismantling? If this question is thinkable, is it
because a) we are trying to make the best of a bad bargain in an era when war and tax-cut
driven budget deficits undermine state capacity and/or b) globalization is increasingly
undercutting the institutions of the nation-state and generating supra-constitutional
obligations and power arrangements? (Finally, if the Court doesn't silence deliberation
over the meaning of the Constitution or settle constitutional questions anyhow,
perhaps we should be rethinking the Court's role in this sometimes vigorous debate over
meaning and values.)
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It has become increasingly difficult for those of us in Political Science to pin
political labels on the diverse array of legal scholars who call out for a people’s
constitution, for taking the constitution away from the courts, or for much greater judicial
restraint so that constitutional values can be deliberated—and indeed more fully owned—
outside the Court.2 One strain of the argument has been staked out by conservatives who
decry the arrogance of the Court in supplanting the will of majorities as they articulate a
Constitution more egalitarian and democratic than the framers gave us.3 In this view,
decency, morality, piety, and federalism are all casualties of an overreaching, powerintoxicated, and rights-creating judiciary. (And, as Scalia told us this week, “[t]hough
the views of our own citizens are essentially irrelevant to the Court’s decision [in Roper
v. Simmons] the views of other countries and the so-called international community take
center stage.”)4 However, these critics of contemporary legal thinking and of political
activism aimed at the Court are now joined by more liberal and progressive legal scholars
1

I borrow part of the title from Jules Lobel, “The Political Tilt of Separation of Powers,” in David Kairys,
ed., The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1998), 591-616.
2

For one very helpful discussion, see Mark A. Graber, “Thick and Thin: Interdisciplinary Conversations on
Populism, Law, Political Science, and Constitutional Change,” 90 Georgetown Law Journal 233
(November, 2001), a contribution to the Symposium: Justice, Democracy, and Humanity: A Celebration of
the Work of Mark Tushnet.

3

Classics include Robert Bork, The Tempting of America (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990); Antonin
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

4

Scalia, J. dissenting in Roper v. Simmons 543 U.S. ____ (2005).
http://a257.g.akamailtech.net/7/257/2422/01mar20051300/www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/04pdf/03633.pdf

3
who, never expecting the Court to be much of a progressive force, are dismayed at the
constitutional order the Rehnquist Court is dismantling (including some of the power of
Congress through the commerce clause, state sovereign immunity, and the Tenth
Amendment). Jack Balkin has pointed out that, “[b]y the end of the 1990s, the major
beneficiaries of the emerging conservative judicial activism appeared to be whites, state
governments, advertisers, opponents of environmental and land use regulation, and
wealthy contributors to political campaigns.”5 Tom Keck calls this the most activist
Court in history, with Sunstein’s most “minimalist” justices embracing judicial review
and demonstrating no significant deference to the elected branches.6 Moderate and left
legal scholars began to urge respect for democratic, majoritarian decision-making,
concerned for what the Court was pre-empting in the name of being faithful to the
Constitution. Those legal scholars who placed far more faith in elected branches and in
social movements than in the Court to bring about real, lasting social change worked
overtime to demonstrate that the heroic efforts of the Court in decisions such as Brown or
Roe had little impact by themselves, in any case.7 Or, the argument that the Constitution
includes values compatible with a wide array of political programs undercut the claim for
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a non-political exercise of judicial review.8 As Mark Graber has pointed out, “virtually
every political movement that has enjoyed substantial political success in the United
States has eventually concluded that the Constitution of the United States privileges its
particular political program.”9
I suspect that some part of the more centrist-liberal interest in popular
constitutionalism can be located in the desire of Third Branch scholars to get in on the
‘decline of civic engagement’ debates. That is, with the proclamation that discussion of
public affairs, trust in government, and social capital are all suffering decline, a less
activist and ambitious Court might leave ambiguities and unfinished business for
legislatures to flesh out—and democratic citizens could even be stimulated to deliberate
the meaning of constitutional values (instead of watching Survivor XV). The Court,
having probably contributed to the problem in the first place by usurping popular
prerogatives, could help Americans with their deficit of democratic deliberation.10
Sunstein’s formulation, in particular, suggests that narrower and less fully-reasoned
decisions are generally more democracy-promoting (or permitting) than other kinds of
decisions. If the object extends beyond getting Congress to say what it means and flesh
out values and goals better—if it is in part to take the Constitution to the streets and town
meetings—I remain skeptical. Leaving Dred Scott aside as an extreme case, I would
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suggest rather that the kinds of decisions that capture popular imagination and discussion
about constitutional values are more like Brown, Roe, and Miranda—decisions that
people recognize because of their relative clarity and breadth.
Given several decades’ decline in so many survey indicators of trust in political
institutions—Congress, the Executive, the press—why is it that trust in the Court is
higher (at least percentages indicating some or a great deal of trust) and remains more
stable than trust in other branches of the federal government? Is it simply because the
Court is more insulated from the public eye and guards its secrets of the temple better,
while Bill Clinton answered press questions about what his underwear looked like?
Judge Walter L. Nixon aside, we see fewer scandals and indicators of corruption
featuring the courts in the press, despite internet cartoons such as the Elmer Fuddinspired one last year that featured duck hunting and Scalia’s refusal to recuse himself in
Cheney.11 If the public believes the Court protects rights they wish to see protected, then
Scalia is the one who wants a minimalist constitution. Alternately, one might make an
argument that the public has grown accustomed to a Court that speaks authoritatively
about its prerogative to say exclusively what the Constitution means, and that we are
happy with aspects of that authoritarianism. After all, perhaps the public craves certainty
and settled, known law, not constant legal deliberation and flux that the adversarial
process generates. (Rousseau certainly thought there was something to this, and so did
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Robert Nagel.12) If we want claims adjudicated, and want to believe that the Constitution
has a clear meaning, why politicize it more than it already is?
In his new volume, Constructing Civil Liberties, Ken Kersch argues that
Ackerman and other liberal legal scholars are busy defending Whiggish narratives and
their liberatory- and society-centered, rather than state-centered analyses of constitutional
development. To defend the constitutional legitimacy of the New Deal order, such
scholars must defend (and simplify the development of) the particular civil rights-civil
liberties arrangements and understandings as the will of the people, while denying that
popular will is expressed in different understandings in the Burger and Rehnquist Court
years.13 While Kersch argues that the Whig narrative is disintegrating before our eyes
because of its own historical implausibility, I would suggest that it is also important to
think about how contemporary scholars are creating new narratives to befit a new state
project and new constitutional order.
Several generations of legal scholars who enshrined Marbury as establishing the
important power of judicial review wrote in support of the Progressive Era and New Deal
Era projects of building state capacity. They tended to endorse a role for the Court in
authorizing the expansion of the power and scope of the national government. And what
of the current revisionist projects that downgrade Marbury and the accomplishments of
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the Marshall Court? What is the political consequence of domestic "juristocracy"
thinking now? Is it not possible that scholars who would take the constitution away from
the Court provide the intellectual foundations for an era of contracting state power, or
nation-state dismantling? If I am at all correct, are we, then, Gramsci’s organic
intellectuals generating the intellectual framework for this new constitutional order as we
engage in handwringing about juristocracy in America?14 I wonder, too, what we may be
saying to those who had such a difficult time having their rights recognized absent
judicial intervention in the political process, however anemic those judicial interventions
may have sometimes been?15 Was the Court not then offering hope, and occasionally
powerful rhetoric, in political struggles? Shall we simply signal our willingness to
abandon minorities and historically disfavored groups to the democratic will just because
judges, too, make value choices?
While it is obvious that there are conservatives and progressives who are
interested in curbing Court power and enhancing democratic deliberation where it is
currently being silenced or supplanted, there is a clear political struggle going on about
what a more vigorous democratic order would look like. If democratic formalism
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“identifies democracy with whatever happens to emerge from majoritarian politics,”16
then how do progressives want to talk about democracy? Since I believe that democracy
probably means something else—something more substantive—to many of those who
might take the Constitution away from the courts, I think it is time for a discussion about
whether progressives who are willing to reduce the Court’s judicial review understand by
democracy something other than “whatever happens to emerge from majoritarian
politics.” What would the struggle over a more democratic constitution look like, and
how might it take place in a less “juristocratic” political order?

A question worth posing is whether a domestic reading of “juristocracy” may be
overly alarmist. The Hirschl study stressed the importance of comparative constitutional
investigation and focused on Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and South Africa to make the
case for mechanisms of judicial empowerment. While Towards Juristoracy considers
important issues for the American context, such as constitutionalization, the judicial
interpretation of rights, and the judicialization of mega-politics, doesn’t the Court in the
U.S. faces major obstacles to the judicialization of politics even if it tries? Wouldn’t the
arguments that the Court is a great deal weaker than it apparently wants to be tend to
support this idea? I do not claim that these obstacles are unique to the United States; I
simply refrain from speculating whether similar obstacles exist in states where the
institutions and traditions of civil society differ.
Perhaps if we think about how to locate the Court in an interpretive community in
the United States, the “juristocracy” problem might diminish. The Supreme Court is
surely not the final arbiter in struggles over the meaning of constitutional principles and
16
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rights. Recent scholarship has had a great deal to say about why and how courts fail to
monopolize the Constitution’s meaning. Mobilized activists, interests groups, lawyers,
legal scholars, social scientists, legislators, administrative officials, other political figures,
journalists and editors, and maybe now even bloggers play important roles and framing—
and reframing—constitutional issues. A jurisprudential model that focuses so exclusively
on the Court’s interpretation of constitutional meaning incorrectly neglects the ways in
which constitutional meanings are actually and actively constructed by other actors in the
political process. There is a great deal of “elaboration of constitutional meaning outside
the courts.”17 According to Keith Whittington, “[t]he jurisprudential model needs to be
supplemented with a more explicitly political one that describes a distinct effort to
understand and rework the meaning of a received constitutional text.”18 Judicial activism
and judicial attempts to foreclose constitutional questions tend to leave unresolved many
issues at stake in political disputes; both historically and in modern contexts, “public
debate over constitutional meaning has been a significant component of developing the
constructions.”19 If the Court cannot monopolize the Constitution’s meaning or foreclose
avenues of deliberation elsewhere, I would suggest there is still room for considerable
creativity in the construction of constitutional meanings.
In some periods of Constitutional contestation, the relationship between the Court
and other members of the interpretive community could be characterized as an iterative
process. Interest groups fund particular cases to get questions before the federal courts;
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they even search for appropriate parties to gain standing.20 As Charles Epp has argued,
the availability of resources for litigation determines the sustained attention particular
issue areas receive in Court.21 Groups, unhappy with a particular Court decision, press
statutory reforms upon Congress or upon state legislatures. Legislative responses help
determine the kind of cases that come to the Court. The Court then engages in statutory
and constitutional construction that leads to criticism by activist reformers and policy
makers, including members of the legal community, followed by a new round of
proposals and responses by institutional actors including the Court. Activists press
particular understandings and expectations about constitutional language and values upon
the Court, and doctrinal developments within the Court both reshape the efforts and affect
the mobilization language and strategies of activists.22
Moreover, if the Court sometimes appears to settle constitutional matters for a
time (e.g., the New Deal Court’s reading of substantial effects and aggregate effects on
interstate commerce), the Court also frequently unsettles constitutional matters. Some
moments are riper than are others for those outside the Court to contest particular
constitutional meanings. Opportunities may come and go like “policy windows” that
policy entrepreneurs attempt to exploit when a problem is recognized, a solution is
20
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developed in the policy community, and the opportunity for policy change is present.
These “windows” may stay open only for short periods.23 If periods of negotiation of
constitutional meanings can be described in terms of dialogue or iteration, the allocation
of attention to issues and problems on the Court may nevertheless tend to be more
episodic than incremental. Frameworks through which issues are analyzed in the Court
may, somewhat like Congress, alternate between periods of relative stability and rapid
change, as Baumgartner and Jones recognize that “the American political system lurches
from one point of apparent equilibrium to another.”24 This approach would seem to
comport with Whittington’s analysis of the “punctuated character of much of
constitutional development,” when political pressures and preexisting institutions, norms
and settlements that hitherto contained them reach an untenable point.25
Although I have borrowed from literature describing the patterning of other
American political institutions, it is of course the case that the Court is not an institution
that simply resembles or mirrors others. Historical institutionalists Karen Orren and
Stephen Skowronek posit the relative independence of different institutional formations,
born of different historical origins and tending to different patterns of development.
Engagements throughout the polity bring together different norms embedded in different
institutions; “at any moment in time several different sets of rules and norms are likely to
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be operating simultaneously.”26 If, as a result, relations among political institutions are
likely to be in tension, political actors may exploit tensions and contradictions that exist
because of these institutional mismatches, and one can see the potential for creativity by
actors of all sorts.27 Intercurrence specifies “a political universe that is inherently open,
dynamic, and contested, where existing norms and collective projects, of varying degrees
of permanence are buffeted against one another as a normal condition.”28
The Court as an institution has its own norms, dynamics, and institutional history;
it has doctrine, rules, precedents, metaphors, and language peculiar to it. But if
precedents and stories about case law trajectories establish the terrain on which
contestants will frame their complaints, these precedents and stories are constantly
reworked. Litigants bring their own understandings about law when they come to court,
and this ‘contact’ plays a vital role in keeping law in touch with the social order in which
it is embedded. As Ron Kahn has insisted, the Court brings the outside world into its
decision-making in more ways than taking cognizance of events and facts.29
Now if the Court is located in the political system and in the history of American
political development in some of these ways, it is harder to be quite so juricentric. And if
we see the involvement of other institutions and actors in the shaping of the
Constitution’s meaning, a domestic version of “juristocracy” doesn’t carry quite as much
26
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weight. Does juristocracy claim too much? Is it we who are being a bit too courtcentered in our analysis of constitutional dynamics?
There is certainly reason to be concerned that some political issues are being
over-constitutionalized. This may sometimes tend to “freeze” the language with which
we think about questions of values and impoverish our political debate.30 There is reason
to be concerned if other actors in the political system are becoming too deferential to the
judiciary. There is reason to pay close attention to the ways in which international
opinion, treaties, and human rights discourses are reshaping constitutional reasoning and
bringing the world closer together. I do not wish to be Pangloss or Polyanna, but I am
not prepared to conclude that we live in a juristocracy. So I return to an earlier question
about some of the additional reasons this question of juristocracy—along with the
demotion of Marbury—has such resonance for progressives. To what extent is this a
conversation about the ways in which the nation-state is being dismantled from one side
and superseded from another? If we cannot hope to count on the constitutional order
from the era of statebuilding, why count on the Court?
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